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against this particular collusive attack strategy. As an example, we analyze the security of a recently proposed 
multiparty key agreement protocol to show the vulnerability of existing circular-type multiparty quantum key 
agreement protocols against this collusive attack. We then design a general secure multiparty key agreement 
model that would remove this vulnerability from such circular-type key agreement protocols and describe 
the necessary steps to implement this model. Our model is general and does not depend on the specific 
physical implementation of quantum key agreement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of key agreement was first presented 
by Diffie–Hellman in 1976 [1]. It describes how two 
remote users are able to fairly establish a secured 
shared key based on their private inputs. In 1982, 
Ingemarsson et al. [2] extended the two-party key 
agreement protocol to a multiparty or group key 
agreement protocol. After that, several multiparty 
key agreement protocols have been published [3]. 
However, future quantum computers with sufficient 
power will threaten most current cryptosystems 
whose security mainly relies on unproven 
mathematical assumptions. For that reason, quantum 
applications in cryptography have attracted the 
attention of a lot of scientists and researchers in order 
to develop information-theoretically unconditional 
secure cryptosystems. One of the most common 
quantum cryptographic applications is quantum key 
distribution (QKD) [4], in which remote parties can 
generate a shared random key securely even in the 
presence of an attacker with unlimited classical or 
 
 
quantum computing power. Subsequently, several 
quantum cryptographic applications have been 
introduced to solve various classical security issues 
[5-14]. Recently, quantum key agreement (QKA) has 
attracted the attention of a lot of researchers [15]. 
QKA ensures fairness between the involved parties 
to generate a shared secure key based on their private 
inputs. Using the quantum teleportation protocol, 
Zhou et al. [15], in 2004, presented the first two-party 
QKA scheme.   
In 2013, the two-party QKA was extended to 
multiparty QKA protocols [16]. Subsequently, 
several multiparty QKA protocols have been 
presented [17-20]. In general, as noted in [16], there 
are three types of MQKA protocols; 1) the first type 
is the tree-type in which every party sends their 
secret data through independent quantum channels to 
all other parties [21]; 2) the second type is the 
complete-graph-type in which every participant 
sends a sequence of qubits to each of the others 
parties to encode her or his secret information, 3) 
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while in the third type that is the circle-type 
(sometimes called traveling-mode) [6,22], every 
party generates a random sequence of qubits and 
sends this sequence to another party who applies an 
encoding process producing a new evolved sequence 
of qubits and sends the new sequence to the next 
party; this process continues over all parties until the 
evolved sequence reaches the party who generates 
the first sequence. Compared to the other QKA types, 
the circle-type is more efficient and more easily 
achieves the property of fairness. For that reason, the 
QKA circle-type has been intensively investigated. 
In 2016, Liu et al. [16] pointed out that all existing 
circle-type multiparty quantum key agreement (CT-
MQKA) protocols are vulnerable to collusive attack, 
and asked a challenging question about the 
possibility of designing a secure CT-MKQA 
protocol. In response to this question, several CT-
MQKA protocols have been proposed to avoid a 
collusive attack. However, in this work, we show that 
most of the existing CT-MQKA protocols are also 
not secure against a collusive attack. We study, as an 
example, the security of Sun et al.’s MQKA protocol 
(named SCWZ protocol hereafter) to show the 
vulnerability of the existing CT-MQKA protocols to 
collusive attacks. Furthermore, we design a general 
secure model for CT-MQKA protocols and propose 
the necessary steps for this model.   
II. THE INSECURITY OF EXISTING CT-
MQKA PROTOCOLS 
In this section, we show that most of the recently 
published works in CT-MQKA are not secure against 
collusive attacks [17-19,23,24]. In general, there are 
two main collusive attack strategies, which could be 
applied to the CT-MQKA protocols:  
1) The first collusive attack strategy 
The first collusive attack strategy has been 
pointed out in [16,17]. Any two dishonest 
participants 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 (where 𝑖 > 𝑗; 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈
{1, 2, … , 𝑛} and 𝑛 is the number of participants) in 
particular positions in the circle-type protocols 
can control the final key if their particular 
positions meet the following two conditions: 
𝑖 − 𝑗 =
𝑛
2
    when 𝑛 is even, (1) 
𝑖 − 𝑗 =
𝑛+1
2
 or 
𝑛−1
2
    when 𝑛 is odd. (2) 
2) The second collusive attack strategy 
The second collusive attack strategy, as pointed 
out in our previous work [6], can be described as 
follows. In the CT-MQKA schemes, any two 
dishonest participants 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 can steal the 
private inputs of an honest participant 𝑃𝑘 (𝑖, 𝑗,
𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑛}) without being detected, if their 
particular positions meet one of the two following 
conditions: 
𝑖 − 𝑗 = 2; then k= 𝑖 − 1; (3) 
𝑗 − 𝑖 = 2; then k= 𝑗 − 1. (4) 
A. Review of SCWZ’s protocol 
In SCWZ’s protocol, there are 𝑛 participants and 
each participant 𝑃𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛) has an 𝑚 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡 
key (𝐾𝑖). The participants want to generate a shared 
secret key 𝐾 fairly, where 𝐾 = 𝐾1 ⨁ 𝐾2  ⨁ … ⨁ 𝐾𝑛. 
The steps of the SCWZ’s protocol can be described 
as follows. 
1) Preparation phase. The server generates 𝑛 
sequences of random single-photons. Each 
sequence 𝑆𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛) contains 𝑚 
single-photons and each photon is selected 
randomly from the four states 
{|+⟩, |−⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩}, where |±⟩ =
1
√2
(|0⟩ ±
|1⟩). The server also generates 𝑛 sequences 
of random single photons (called 𝐶𝑖), which 
are used as decoy photons to check the 
existence of eavesdroppers. Each single 
decoy photon is randomly selected from the 
states {|+⟩, |−⟩, |+𝑦⟩, |−𝑦⟩}, where |±𝑦⟩ =
1
√2
(|0⟩ ± 𝑖|1⟩). The server then randomly 
inserts and distributes the single-photons of 
𝐶𝑖 into 𝑆𝑖 getting a new sequence 𝑆𝑖
′, and 
sends the new sequence (𝑆𝑖) to 𝑃𝑖.  
2) Detection phase. Upon receiving 𝑆𝑖
′, each 
participant sends an acknowledgment to the 
server. Then the server announces the 
positions of 𝐶𝑖 and their measurement bases. 
Each 𝑃𝑖 measures 𝐶𝑖 based on the 
corresponding measurement bases and stores 
the results. 𝑃𝑖 then randomly announces half 
of the measurement results of 𝐶𝑖; the server, 
in turn, announces the initial states of the 
second half of 𝐶𝑖. Then both the server and 𝑃𝑖 
collaborate to compute the error rate. They 
end the protocol if the error rate higher than a 
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predefined value. Otherwise, they continue to 
finish the protocol.  
3) After 𝑃𝑖 gets the secure sequence 𝑆𝑖, each 
participant performs the next sub-steps:  
A. Encoding phase. 𝑃𝑖 encodes secret 
information (𝐾𝑖) onto 𝑆𝑖 by applying the 
unitary operation 𝑈 = |0⟩⟨1| − |1⟩⟨0| 
when the classical bit of the secret 𝐾𝑖 is 1, 
and by applying the unitary operation 𝐼 =
|0⟩⟨0| + |1⟩⟨1| when the classical bit 𝐾𝑖 
is 0. 𝑃𝑖 then reorders the decoy states 
prepared and inserted by the server in 
Step (1) and reinserts them in random 
positions into the encoded sequence 
obtaining a new sequence (𝑆𝑖
𝑖+1), and 
sends 𝑆𝑖
𝑖+1 to 𝑃𝑖+1.  
B. Eavesdropping check phase. Upon 
receiving 𝑆𝑖
𝑖+1, 𝑃𝑖+1 and 𝑃𝑖 check the 
security of the transmission by 
performing the same process indicated in 
step (2) between the server and 𝑃𝑖. 
C. Encoding phase. After checking the 
security of transmission, 𝑃𝑖+1 encodes 
secret information (𝐾𝑖+1) onto 𝑆𝑖 
following the same rules as in step (A).  
𝑃𝑖+1 then reorders the decoy states and 
reinserts them in random positions into 
the encoded sequence obtaining a new 
sequence (𝑆𝑖
𝑖+2), and sends 𝑆𝑖
𝑖+2 to 𝑃𝑖+2. 
D. Similarly, the rest of the participants 
(𝑃𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑖+3, … , 𝑃𝑖−2) perform the 
Eavesdropping check phase and the 
Encoding phase indicated in steps (B) 
and (C).  
E. Upon receiving 𝑆𝑖
𝑖−2, 𝑃𝑖−1 and 𝑃𝑖−2 check 
the security of transmission. If the 
quantum channel between 𝑃𝑖−1 and 𝑃𝑖−2 
is secure, 𝑃𝑖−2 discards the decoy photons 
to get 𝑆𝑖, and informs the server of this 
fact.  
4) When all the 𝑃𝑖−1 receive 𝑆𝑖, they send an 
acknowledgment to the server, and the server 
announces the measurement bases of 𝑆𝑖 to all 
the 𝑃𝑖−1. After that, each 𝑃𝑖−1 uses the 
corresponding measurement bases to 
measure 𝑆𝑖 obtaining 𝐾𝑖
′, where 𝐾𝑖
′ =
𝐾𝑖 ⨁ 𝐾𝑖+1  ⨁ … ⨁𝐾𝑖−2. Finally, 𝑃𝑖−1 can 
recover the final shared secret key 𝐾 =
𝐾𝑖
′ ⨁ 𝐾𝑖−1.  
B. The collusive attack against CT-MQKA 
protocols 
In this section, we show that the SCWZ’s protocol, 
as an example of CR-MQKA protocols, is insecure 
against a collusive attack. Although the authors have 
presented the security analysis to prove the security 
of their protocol against the first model of the 
collusive attack mentioned in Section 2, their 
protocol is not secure against the second security 
model of collusive attack. That is to say, any two 
dishonest participants 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 in particular 
positions meeting the conditions in (3) and (4) can 
easily steal the private key of the honest participants 
(𝑃𝑘). 
Without loss of generality, assume we have three 
participants 𝑃1, 𝑃2, and 𝑃3 and they have three private 
keys, e.g., 𝐾1 = 1000, 𝐾2 = 0101, and 𝐾3 = 1001, 
respectively. And the three participants intend to 
share a secret key (𝐾), here 𝐾 = 𝐾1 ⨁ 𝐾2 ⨁𝐾3 =
0100. We also assume that 𝑃1 and 𝑃3 are two 
dishonest participants and they need to steal the 
private key of the honest one (𝑃1); hence they can 
deduce the final key without being caught. The 
server generates three random sequences, e.g., 𝑆1 =
{|+⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩, |−⟩}, 𝑆2 = {|0⟩, |1⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩}, and 𝑆3 =
{|0⟩, |+⟩, |−⟩, |1⟩} each one consists of four single-
photons. Also, the server generates three random 
sequences 𝐶1, 𝐶2, and 𝐶3 each one consists of four 
decoy single-photon states. Then the server 
randomly inserts the decoy state  𝐶1 (𝐶2/𝐶3) into 𝑆1 =
{|+⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩, |−⟩} (𝑆2 = {|0⟩, |1⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩}/𝑆3 =
{|0⟩, |+⟩, |−⟩, |1⟩}) and sends it to 𝑃1 (𝑃2/𝑃3). After 
checking the security of the transmission, each 
participant discards the decoys and encodes their 
private information based on the encoding rule 
mentioned in Step 3.A. Subsequently, each 
participant sends the sequence in a circle to the other 
participants to encode their private inputs until the 
sequence is returned back to the participant. 
For simplicity, we show here the circle of 𝑆1 (Fig. 
1.a) which will be used by the participant 𝑃1 to get 
the final key (𝐾). First, 𝑃1 encodes a private input, 
i.e., 𝐾1 = 1000 into 𝑆1 getting the new sequence 
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𝑆1 = { 𝑈|+⟩, 𝐼|0⟩, 𝐼|1⟩, 𝐼|−⟩}. Then 𝑃1 inserts some 
decoy photons into 𝑆1 and sends it to the dishonest 
𝑃3 instead of sending it to 𝑃2. After checking the 
security of the transmission, 𝑃3 discards the decoy 
states and gets 𝑆1 = { 𝑈|+⟩, 𝐼|0⟩, 𝐼|1⟩, 𝐼|−⟩}. In 
addition, the dishonest 𝑃1 generates a counterfeit 
sequence, e.g., 𝑆1
′ = { |0⟩, |0⟩, |−⟩, |+⟩} with decoy 
states and sends it to both 𝑃2 and 𝑃3. Obviously, 𝑃2 
cannot distinguish between the genuine sequences 
and the counterfeit one. So, 𝑃2 encodes the private 
data, i.e., 𝐾2 = 0101 into 𝑆1
′  getting 𝑆1
′ =
{ 𝐼|0⟩, 𝑈|0⟩, 𝐼|−⟩, 𝑈|+⟩} and sends 𝑆1
′  with decoy 
states to 𝑃3. After checking the security of the 
transmission, 𝑃3 discards the decoy qubits and gets 
𝑆1
′ . 𝑃3 then requests the corresponding measurement 
bases of 𝑆1
′  from 𝑃1 to get 𝐾2 = 0101. Based on her 
or his private key, i.e., 𝐾3 = 1001 and the private 
key of 𝑃2, 𝑃3 applies the corresponding unitary 
operations to the genuine sequence 𝑆1 =
{ 𝑈|+⟩, 𝐼|0⟩, 𝐼|1⟩, 𝐼|−⟩} getting 𝑆1 =
{𝑈(𝐼(𝑈|+⟩)), 𝐼(𝑈(𝐼|0⟩)), 𝐼(𝐼(𝐼|1⟩)), 𝑈(𝑈(𝐼|−⟩))} 
and sends it to 𝑃1. Then the participants announce to 
the server that the quantum channels are secure. 
Finally, the server announces the measurement bases 
of 𝑆1 to 𝑃1 thus enabling 𝑃1 to get K.  
Similarly, if 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 (𝑃2 and 𝑃1) are the dishonest 
participants they can steal the private key of the 
honest participant 𝑃1 (𝑃3) in the circle while sending 
𝑆2 (𝑆3), as shown in Fig. 1.b (Fig. 1.c). By applying 
the same attack strategy, most of the existing CR-
MQKA protocols [17-19,23,24] are vulnerable to 
this collusive attack.  
III. THE PROPOSED SECURE CT-MQKA 
PROTOCOL 
In this section, we give a general secure model of 
CT-MQKA against the collusive attack described 
above. Whereas our protocol can be implemented 
with photons, we describe it in more general terms 
here. The idea of adopting a semi-honest client-
server model (or a third party) has been adopted in 
many previous QKA protocols to ensure the security 
of communication [17,20,25-27]. Suppose we have 
𝑛 participants who want to generate a shared secret 
key 𝐾 fairly, where 𝐾 = 𝐾1 ⨁ 𝐾2  ⨁ … ⨁𝐾𝑛 with 
length 𝑚. Every participant (𝑃𝑖) has a private 
classical key (𝐾𝑖
′), where 𝐾𝑖
′ = 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑛ℓ. Here, ℓ is 
the number of decoy states used for checking the 
security of a quantum channel, and 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑛.  
The general steps of this secure CT-MQKA model 
can be described as follows: 
Step (1): The server generates 𝑛 sequences 𝑆𝑖 (𝑖=1, 
2, …, n), with each sequence containing 𝑚 + 𝑛ℓ 
single qubits. The server records the position of each 
single qubit. Every qubit is selected randomly from 
the four quantum states {|+⟩ =
1
√2
(|0⟩ + |1⟩), |−⟩ =
1
√2
(|0⟩ − |1⟩), |0⟩, |1⟩}. The server also generates 𝑛 
sequences of random single qubits (called 𝐶𝑖), which 
are used as decoy states to check the existence of 
eavesdroppers. Every single decoy qubit is randomly 
selected from the four quantum states 
{|+⟩, |−⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩}. Then the server inserts 𝐶𝑖 into 𝑆𝑖 
producing a new sequence 𝑆𝑖
′, and sends the new 
sequence (𝑆𝑖
′) to 𝑃𝑖. 
Step (2): Upon receiving 𝑆𝑖
′, every participant sends 
an acknowledgment to the server. Then the server 
announces the positions of 𝐶𝑖 and their measurement 
bases. Every 𝑃𝑖 measures 𝐶𝑖 based on the 
corresponding measurement bases and stores the 
results. 𝑃𝑖 then randomly announces half of the 
measurement results of 𝐶𝑖; the server, in turn, 
announces the initial states of the second half of 𝐶𝑖. 
Then both the server and 𝑃𝑖 collaborate to compute 
the error rate. They end the protocol if the error rate 
is higher than a predefined value. Otherwise, 𝑃𝑖 
discards 𝐶𝑖 from 𝑆𝑖
′ getting 𝑆𝑖 and continues to Step 
(3). 
Step (3): After every 𝑃𝑖 gets the secure sequence 𝑆𝑖, 
each  𝑃𝑖  performs the next substeps: 
a) Encoding phase. 𝑃𝑖 encodes the secret 
information (𝐾𝑖
′) onto 𝑆𝑖 by applying the 
unitary operation 𝐼 = |0⟩⟨0| + |1⟩⟨1| when 
the classical bit 𝐾𝑖 is 0, and by applying the 
unitary operation 𝑈 = |0⟩⟨1| − |1⟩⟨0| if the 
classical bit 𝐾𝑖 is 1 (see also Table 1). 
b) Detecting the external attack phase. For 
detecting external eavesdroppers, 𝑃𝑖 
generates a sequence of random single qubits 
(𝐶𝑝𝑖), which are used as decoy qubits to check 
the existence of eavesdroppers in the 
quantum channel between 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖+1 (note, 
the symbol + in “𝑖 + 1“ represents the 
additional mod 𝑛. Every single decoy qubit is 
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randomly selected from the four quantum 
states {|+⟩, |−⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩}. Then 𝑃𝑖 inserts 𝐶𝑝𝑖 
into 𝑆𝑖 producing a new sequence 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+1, and 
sends the new sequence (𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+1) to 𝑃𝑖+1. As 
in Step (2), 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖+1 share the information 
of 𝐶𝑝𝑖 to measure it; then, they collaborate to 
compute the error rate. 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖+1 end the 
protocol if the error rate is higher than a 
predefined value. Otherwise, 𝑃𝑖+1 discards 
𝐶𝑝𝑖 from 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+1 obtaining 𝑆𝑖 and continues to 
the next process.  
c) Detecting the internal attack phase. Upon 
confirming that the communication between 
𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖+1 is secure against the external 
attackers, the server randomly selects ℓ 
single-qubits as decoy qubits from 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+1, by 
announcing their positions, and asks 𝑃𝑖 to 
publicly announce the unitary operations that 
were applied to the ℓ qubits. Then, the server 
announces the measurement bases of the ℓ 
qubits to 𝑃𝑖+1. 𝑃𝑖+1 measures the ℓ qubits 
using the corresponding measurement bases. 
Based on the measurement results, the 
measurement bases and the applied unitary 
operations,  𝑃𝑖+1 can judge whether the ℓ 
qubits are genuine or not. If not, 𝑃𝑖+1 ends the 
protocol. Otherwise, the participants do the 
following: i) 𝑃𝑖+1 discards the ℓ qubits 
selected by the server, from 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+1; ii) the 
server also discards the corresponding ℓ 
qubits from 𝑆𝑖; iii) every 𝑃𝑖 discards the 
corresponding classical bits from their 
private keys 𝐾𝑖
′.  
d) After discarding the ℓ qubits and the 
corresponding classical bits, 𝑃𝑖+1 encodes the 
secret information (𝐾𝑖+1
′ ) onto 𝑆𝑖 as in Step 
(3.a), then inserts some random decoy states 
(𝐶𝑝𝑖+1) into 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+1 producing 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+2. Then, 
𝑃𝑖+1 sends 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+2 to 𝑃𝑖+2.  
e) Upon receiving 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑖+1 and 𝑃𝑖+2 
collaborate to check the security of 
communication by performing the Step 
(3. 𝑎 − 3. 𝑑); then 𝑃𝑖+2 encodes her or his 
information and sends the new sequences to 
the next participants. This process continues 
until 𝑃𝑖 receives the secure quantum message 
(𝑆𝑖↦𝑖−1) from 𝑃𝑖−1; here, the symbol “−“ in 
“𝑖 − 1“ represents the subtraction mod 𝑛.  
Step (4): When all 𝑃𝑖s receive 𝑆𝑖↦𝑖−1, they discard 
the decoy qubits getting 𝑆𝑖. Hence, each participant 
loses 𝑛ℓ classical bits from 𝐾𝑖
′ getting 𝐾𝑖 with length 
𝑚. After that, they send an acknowledgment to the 
server, and the server announces the measurement 
bases of 𝑆𝑖 to all the 𝑃𝑖s. Subsequently, every 𝑃𝑖 uses 
the corresponding measurement bases to measure 𝑆𝑖 
obtaining 𝐾, where 𝐾 = 𝐾1 ⨁ 𝐾2  ⨁ … ⨁𝐾𝑛.  
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPOSED 
PROTOCOL 
 For simplicity, suppose we have three participants 
𝑃1, 𝑃2 , and 𝑃3 and they want to generate a shared 
secret key 𝐾 = 𝐾1 ⨁ 𝐾2 ⨁ 𝐾3 with length 𝑚 (e.g., 
𝑚 = 3). The three participants 𝑃1, 𝑃2 , and 𝑃3 have 
three private keys 𝐾1
′, 𝐾2
′, and 𝐾3
′, respectively, with 
length 𝑚 + 𝑛ℓ, e.g., 𝑚 + 𝑛ℓ = 3 + (3 ∗ 3) = 12; 
here 𝑛ℓ is the number of decoy states for checking 
the security of all quantum channels in one complete 
 
FIG 1. An example of a three-party QKA protocol. Any two dishonest participants in particular positions 
can steal the private input of an honest participant. 
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circle, and for the 𝑛 circle it will be 𝑛 ∗ 𝑛ℓ. Here, 
there are three complete circles for three participants, 
and the number of decoy qubits for checking the 
security of all quantum channels is 𝑛 ∗ 𝑛ℓ = 9ℓ. 
Also, we assume that, 𝐾1
′ = 000001101101, 𝐾2
′ =
111011101000, and 𝐾3
′ = 110011010110. 
The server generates a sequence of quantum states 
contains 12 random states (e.g., 𝑆1 = 
|0⟩, |0⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩ |0⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩ |0⟩, |1⟩, |−⟩, |+⟩, |−⟩) for 
the first circle and sends it to 𝑃1. 𝑃1 checks the 
security of the transmission with the server as in Step 
(2). Based on her/his private data (𝐾1
′), 𝑃1 applies the 
unitary operations {𝐼, 𝐼, 𝐼, 𝐼, 𝐼, 𝑈, 𝑈, 𝐼, 𝑈, 𝑈, 𝐼, 𝑈} to 𝑆1 
getting  𝑆1↦2 =
|0⟩, |0⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩ |0⟩, −|1⟩, |0⟩ |0⟩, |0⟩, −|+⟩, |+⟩, −|+⟩
. 𝑃1 then inserts some decoy qubits into 𝑆1↦2 and 
sends it to 𝑃2. 𝑃2 then performs Step (3.b) to detect 
the external attack. As in Step (3.c), the server 
chooses random ℓ states (e.g., ℓ = 1) from 𝑆1 and 
announce the position of ℓ (e.g., the position of last 
state in 𝑆1) to 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. The server then asks 𝑃1 to 
announce the unitary operation that was applied to ℓ, 
and asks 𝑃2 to announce the measurement result of 
the corresponding states in 𝑆1↦2 (i.e., −|+⟩), 
respectively. Based on the announced information 
(|−⟩, 𝑈, −|+⟩), the server can judge whether 𝑃2 has 
received genuine information or not. Then, the server 
and 𝑃2 discard the last sequence from 𝑆1 and 𝑆1↦2 
getting new updated sequences  𝑆1 = ( 
|0⟩, |0⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩ |0⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩ |0⟩, |1⟩, |−⟩, |+⟩) and 
𝑆1↦2 = (|0⟩, |0⟩,
|0⟩, |1⟩ |0⟩, −|1⟩, |0⟩ |0⟩, |0⟩, −|+⟩, |+⟩), 
respectively. Also, all participants update their 
private keys by discarding the corresponding 
classical bits. The updated private keys of 𝑃1, 𝑃2 , and 
𝑃3 become 𝐾1
′ = 00000110110, 𝐾2
′ =
11101110100, and 𝐾3
′ = 11001101011, 
respectively. They also consume two quantum states 
(e.g., the last two states) for checking the quantum 
channel between (𝑃2 and 𝑃3) and (𝑃3 and 𝑃1). The 
updated private keys after completing one circle are 
as follows:  𝐾1
′ = 000001101, 𝐾2
′ = 111011101, 
and 𝐾3
′ = 110011010. And the updated private keys 
after completing the three circles are as follows: 
𝐾1
′ = 000, 𝐾2
′ = 111, and 𝐾3
′ = 110. Now, |𝐾| =
|𝐾1| = |𝐾2| = |𝐾3| = |𝐾1
′| = |𝐾2
′| = |𝐾2
′|. Finally, 
each participant can get the final key 𝐾 =
𝐾1 ⨁ 𝐾2  ⨁𝐾3 = 000⨁111 ⨁ 110 = 001. Note, for 
simplicity, we assumed that each time, the server 
chooses the last state for checking the security of 
communication; but the selected positions should be 
completely random. 
V. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS   
This section presents detailed security analyses for 
both the external eavesdropping and internal attacks.  
A. External attack  
In the proposed protocol, the decoy state technique 
is used to prevent external eavesdroppers form 
attacking the protocol. To achieve that, a sequence of 
single decoy qubits is randomly selected from the 
states {|+⟩, |−⟩, |0⟩, |1⟩} and then inserted in random 
positions into the secret message. The eavesdropper 
(Eve) cannot distinguish between the decoy-states 
and secret message states. Eve may try to entangle a 
secret message state with an auxiliary quantum state 
(|𝜖⟩) by applying a unitary operation (𝑈𝜖) as follows: 
𝑈𝜖|0⟩|𝜖⟩ = 𝛼1|0⟩|𝜖00⟩ + 𝑎2|1⟩|𝜖01⟩, (5) 
𝑈𝜖|0⟩|𝜖⟩ = 𝛼1|0⟩|𝜖00⟩ + 𝑎2|1⟩|𝜖01⟩, (6) 
𝑈𝑒|+⟩|𝜖⟩ =
1
2
[|+⟩(𝛼1|𝜖00⟩ + 𝛼2|𝜖01⟩ +
𝛼3|𝜖10⟩ + 𝛼4|𝜖11⟩) + |−⟩(𝛼1|𝜖00⟩ − 𝛼2|𝜖01⟩ +
𝛼3|𝜖10⟩ − 𝛼4|𝜖11⟩)], (7) 
𝑈𝑒|−⟩|𝜖⟩ =
1
2
[|+⟩(𝛼1|𝜖00⟩ + 𝛼2|𝜖01⟩ −
𝛼3|𝜖10⟩ − 𝛼4|𝜖11⟩) + |−⟩(𝛼1|𝜖00⟩ − 𝛼2|𝜖01⟩ −
𝛼3|𝜖10⟩ + 𝛼4|𝜖11⟩)]. (8) 
In (5) and (6), |𝛼1|
2 + |𝑎2|
2 = 1 and |𝛼3|
2 +
|𝛼4|
2 = 1. Also, |𝜖00⟩, |𝜖01⟩, |𝜖10⟩, and |𝜖11⟩ are four 
ancilla states decided by Eve. To pass the external 
eavesdropping detection phase, Eve sets 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 =
0, if the targeted quantum state is |0⟩ or |1⟩, and 
(𝛼1|𝑒00⟩ − 𝛼2|𝑒01⟩ − 𝛼3|𝑒10⟩ + 𝛼4|𝑒11⟩) =
TABLE I. The encoding rules. 
Unitary operations / quantum states |0⟩ |1⟩ |+⟩ |−⟩ 
0 ⟹ 𝐼 |0⟩ |1⟩ |+⟩ |−⟩ 
1 ⟹ 𝑈 −|1⟩ |0⟩ |−⟩ −|+⟩ 
The unitary operation 𝐼 represents 0 and the unitary operation 𝑈 represents 1. 
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 (𝛼1|𝑒00⟩ − 𝛼2|𝑒01⟩ + 𝛼3|𝑒10⟩ − 𝛼4|𝑒11⟩) = 0, if 
the targeted quantum state is |+⟩ or |−⟩. But these 
malicious procedures cannot help Eve to extract any 
useful information from the private inputs. For 
example, if Eve sets 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0, she gets |𝛼1|
2 = 
|𝛼4|
2 = 1, which means that 𝛼1|𝜖00⟩ = 𝛼4|𝜖11⟩. So, 
Eve cannot reveal private inputs. Besides, the 
proposed CT-MQKA protocol is not open to the 
Trojan horse attack since all information is sent in a 
one-way manner [28,29].  
B. Internal attack 
In the QKA protocols, a collusive attack is the most 
powerful internal attack in which two or more 
dishonest participants collude together to extract 
sensitive information or generate the final key alone 
without revealing their malicious behavior. In this 
subsection, we show that the proposed model is 
immune to collusive attacks, such that any group of 
dishonest participants trying to perform a collusive 
attack (including the two attack strategies mentioned 
in section 2) will be detected immediately. Indeed, 
dishonest participants rely mainly on two important 
processes to successfully achieve the collusive 
attack; 1) sharing information about the carrier 
quantum states that will be used to encode the private 
data and generate the final key, 2) deceiving the 
honest participants to deduce their private data by 
sending forged data. Therefore, to prevent the 
collusive attack, dishonest participants should be 
prevented from conducting these two processes. In 
our protocol, a semi-honest server is used, as 
indicated in Step (1), to generate the initial quantum 
states (𝑆𝑖) that will be used to encode the private 
inputs of the participants. The server shares (𝑆𝑖) with 
all participants after they receive the encoded data. 
In that case, all participants use the shared 
information to deduce the final key fairly. Also, the 
server checks the security of the quantum channel 
between every two participants and makes sure that 
the receiver has received genuine quantum states. 
Using these two processes, the protocol guarantees 
that the honest participant has received genuine data, 
and the dishonest participants cannot obtain useful 
information to generate the final key alone or steal 
the private inputs of honest participants.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this work, we showed that most of the existing 
circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement 
protocols are insecure against a specific type of 
collusive attack. We analyzed the security of a 
recently proposed circular-type multiparty quantum 
key agreement protocol to demonstrate the 
vulnerability of such protocols. Then, we proposed a 
general secure quantum key agreement model to 
avoid the different types of collusive attacks. We 
showed that the proposed protocol could generate the 
final key correctly, and that the prosed protocol is 
secure against all known collusive attack strategies. 
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